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A N I M A L  BEHAVIOR A N D  THE PHYSIOLOGY 
OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 
you see a moth fly towards the light, o r  a 
sume that the animal has the same sort of feelings about 
the matter as yourself-the moth goes t o  the light out 
of curiosity o r  because it likes the light, and the cockroach 
realizes the danger and seeks safety in flight. But you 
really cannot be sure what the animal’s feelings are;  possi- 
bly there is not much of anything in the minds of these 
insects and other low forms of life. W e  must try first t o  
explain their behavior without assuming human-like motives, 
fo r  such an explanation would be simpler and therefore 
preferable to one that made unnecessary assumptions. 
Insects do, in fact, behave in a very mechanical manner. 
Take the case of the moth. I t  has been found that the 
force with which a moth’s wings beat is directly propor- 
tional to the intensity of the light that strikes the moth’s 
eyes, Further, if just one eye is struck by the light (say 
the other is blackened), then the wing on the opposite side 
of the body does the beating; the wing on the same side 
beats feebly o r  not a t  all. If now, a moth is not headed 
directly for  the light, one wing beats harder than the 
other, because one eye is in the shadow of the animal’s own 
head and the other is not. T h e  unequal beating of the wings 
causes the moth to  turn, just as a boat would if one oa r  
were pulled harder than the other. T h e  moth continues to 
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WHEN cockroach flee a t  your approach, you naturally as- 
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turn until both eyes receive the same amount of light, 
but the eyes are equally illuminated only when the moth 
is headed directly f o r  the light. Both wings now beat with 
equal force, there is no further cause fo r  turning, and since 
the moth is headed towards the light, its flight carries it 
towards the lamp from which the light is coming. 
T h a t  the explanation just given is correct can be proved 
very simply. A moth, placed in a box which is uniformly 
illuminated from all sides, does not move in any particular 
direction, because both eyes are receiving the same amount 
of light; but if one eye is blackened so that the other eye 
constantly receives more light, then one wing beats harder 
than the other and the moth ffies in circIes. 
It is obvious from this last experiment that the moth does 
not move to  the light out of curiosity or  from love of the 
light. A human being would find one eye about as useful 
as two in satisfying his curiosity, and when he got to the 
light, his behavior would not necessarily be different whether 
he possessed both eyes o r  just one. 
T h e  mechanical behavior of the sort just described for  
the moth can be well shown in connection with certain very 
small animals known as Paramecia. These are not very 
familiar animals on account of their microscopic dimensions. 
You might drink a glass of water without knowing that you 
were swallowing millions of Paramecia o r  even suspecting 
that there was anything unusual about the water apart  from 
the fact that it was got from a slightly stagnant pond. I n  
order t o  see the Paramecia you would have to  examine a 
drop of water under a microscope. You would then see 
that they lacked a nervous system, and in general that  they 
had a very simple structure. You would be struck first 
of all by their smooth, gliding motion through the water, 
in spite of the apparent lack of swimming organs; but if 
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you examined a Paramecium very closely you would notice 
on its surface a covering of minute processes shaped like 
hairs, or rather like eyelashes, and known as cilia, and you 
would see that the cilia were constantly beating and causing 
the Paramecia to  move. 
Paramecia ordinarily swim about in all directions ; but 
let us pass an electric current through the water, and see 
what happens. T o  do this, we insert wires from an ordi- 
nary dry battery into a drop of water that  contains the 
Paramecia. By means of a key the electric circuit can be 
made or  broken a t  will. So let us close the circuit. Im- 
mediately all the Paramecia move in the direction of the 
current and migrate towards the end of one of the wires 
connected with the battery, in particular, the wire connected 
with the negative pole of the battery. If the current con- 
tinues long enough the Paramecia collect about the wire 
just as  moths do about a light, and fo r  a similar reason. 
Briefly stated, the reaction depends upon the fact that  nega- 
tive electricity reverses the beating movements of the cilia. 
With this simple fact in mind, let us analyze the reaction. 
W e  will begin with the Paramecia swimming in all direc- 
tions. Let  us focus our attention on an individual that  is 
not headed directly f o r  the negative pole so that  one side 
of the animal is more o r  less facing this pole, and the other 
side is not. If we will think of negative electricity as 
issuing from the negative pole in straight lines very much 
as light does from any source, then we may regard one side 
of the Paramecium as in the shadow, as  it were, of its own 
body, and on this side the cilia beat as usual. But on the 
side exposed to  the negative electricity, their beating move- 
ments are reversed. This reversal of the cilia causes a 
turning movement, again very much like the turning 
movement of a boat when a person pulls on one oa r  and 
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backs water with the other. T h e  turning movement of 
Paramecium will continue until the long axis of the animal 
is parallel to the direction of the current. Now equal 
numbers of cilia on both sides are reversed. More- 
over, only a few of the cilia a t  the front end are reversed; 
those farther back are not exposed to  the negative pole, 
because of the animal’s shape. There is  now no further 
cause for turning, and Paramecium moves straight fo r  the 
negative pole. 
Note, now, that the reactions of both the moth and the 
Paramecium have very much in common. Both animals 
come to be fixed in such a position that the length of their 
bodies corresponds to  the direction of the light or  electricity, 
as the case may be. Or, to state the matter in another way, 
the body of the animal becomes oriented in such a manner 
that its long axis is parallel t o  the direction of the stimu- 
lus. This orientation is brought about automatically be- 
cause the body, so long as  it is not parallel to the direction 
of the stimulus, is more strongly influenced on one side 
than on the other, and a turning movement results. A 
mechanical response of this nature is known as a tropism. 
Many of the apparently intelligent responses of insects 
and other lower animals are probably of a purely mechanical 
nature. You spy a cockroach on the wall with evil and 
evident intention, and the little beast makes a hasty retreat 
to some crevice ; he seems to  show all the outward evidence 
of fear and excitement, and of a conscious purpose to reach 
cover. But it is possible that we are reading all of these 
mental states into responses which are  purely mechanical, 
just as we do when we say the moth goes to  the light out 
of curiosity. 
Insects get into cracks and crevices probably not because 
they a re  consciously aware of the protection afforded, but 
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because contact of one portion of the body with any solid 
object tends to result in movements such that more of the 
body comes into contact with the surface, and the move- 
ments continue until a maximum surface of the body is in 
contact with the solid surface-and then the animal is in 
the crevice. This is simply another form of tropism. 
Furthermore, many insects do not go towards the light but 
away from i t ;  the reaction is again a tropism with connec- 
tions between eye and muscles the reverse of those men- 
tioned fo r  the moth. As crevices and cracks are usually 
dark, it is easy to  see how the insect might go towards them 
in accordance with the tropism in question; and once he 
arrives a t  a crevice and touches it with his body, another 
tropism (involving response to  contact with solid surfaces) 
carries him into it. 
T h e  insect does not really move to the crack with the 
object in mind of getting in and being protected. H e  gets 
there fo r  one reason, and gets in for  another; and the 
reason in both cases is in the nature of an automatic 
response. 
Much has been written regarding the remarkable be- 
havior of bees and ants, and their supposed powers of rea- 
soning. A consideration of just one o r  two cases will suf- 
fice as examples. Ants will build a bridge across any water 
that  is in their nest and that encircles their young, and come 
to their rescue. T h e  bridge is built by piling up particles of 
dirt in the water. Here  we have something that looks on 
its face very much like reasoning, but it is in fact merely 
a particular expression of a more general instinctive re- 
action which consists in covering up any debris o r  other 
material which the ants cannot remove from their nest. 
They build the bridge across the water even if there are  
no young to  be rescued. T h a t  ants do not know enough 
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to build bridges in order to attain some objective, can be 
shown by a simple experiment. Honey, of which the ants 
are very fond, is placed within easy reach of them in a 
dish. If now the dish is suspended by a string and raised 
slightly from the ground, say a third of an inch, so as t o  be 
inaccessible directly, the ants fail t o  get i t ;  they do not build 
up a little mound of earth from which they might readily 
climb on the dish. 
One of the things that have attracted attention in connec- 
tion with ants is their capacity fo r  communication. An ant 
which has found a supply of food soon returns to  it with 
others ; but she probably has no mysterious powers of com- 
munication by means of which she can describe to the others 
the location of the food supply. This can be shown by the 
fact that  the ants cannot locate the supply if they are 
separated from the one that discovered it while they are 
on their journey to  the supply. But 
what caused them to leave the nest and follow? Ants are 
said to  stroke each other with their feelers, and in this 
way, it is believed, they communicate. A certain kind of 
stroking means “follow me”; :or, perhaps it would be 
better t o  say when an ant is stroked in a certain way by 
another, it automatically follows the latter. And the act 
of stroking may simply be an automatic response which an 
ant gives upon returning to  its nest, after having come 
across a supply of food. 
Of the numerous other cases of behavior which seem to  
involve the power of reasoning in the insects, only one other 
need be mentioned. A certain wasp, Ammophilia, which 
digs its nest in the ground, has been observed to seize a 
small stone in its jaws and use it to pound the loose soil with 
which it had filled up the hole to  the nest. Now this ap- 
pears a t  first sight like a close approach to  reason, in that 
They must be led. 
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it involves the use of a tool. But is it really necessary to  
assume that there is involved here any radical departure 
from the insect’s instinctive behavior? T h e  act of lifting 
up small stones in its jaws, and the act of packing in dirt, are 
parts of the instinctive process of filling the hole to the nest. 
T h e  wasp, in occasionally using a pebble in packing the dirt, 
is simply combining two acts normally involved in the nest- 
building instinct. 
When we come to consider the higher animals, we find, 
together with greater brain development, greater free- 
dom and variety of action. A moth butts its head against 
a lamp, no matt t r  how many times it has previously done 
so. In  contrast to this a higher animal has the capacity 
readily to modify its behavior in the light of experience. 
A child associates the pain involved in touching a flame 
with the sight of the flame, and it does not repeat, a t  least 
not very often, its first act of inexperience. Some connec- 
tion has been made in the child’s brain between the part  
involved in seeing the flame, and the part  involved in feel- 
ing the pain, a connection which is referred to as associa- 
tion and which is a t  the basis of the learning process. 
T h e  power of association resides in the fore part  of the 
brain (the part  just back of the forehead). You naturally 
look to  the structure of the brain fo r  an indication as t o  
how it works. If you examined a thin slice of the brain 
through a microscope, your first impression would be a 
confused mass of threads, but on closer inspection you 
could discover some order out of the apparent confusion. 
You would see numerous connecting units-millions of them 
in the brain as a whole-each resembling somewhat a min- 
ute uprooted plant with a main trunk and side branches and 
with several roots springing from a slightly enlarged bulb- 
like base. These are the neurones. They may be arranged 
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simply end-to-end like the cars of a freight train, a “trunk” 
of one neurone ending near a “root” of the neurone next 
ahead; but as a rule the side branches make additional con- 
nections with other neurones. T h e  adjacent neurones are, 
like the cars of the freight train, separated by a small gap, 
which, in the learning process, is somehow bridged over ; and 
in this way originally separated parts of the brain are 
brought into communication with each other; that is, 
through the process of association. 
T h e  number of neurones in your brain was established a t  
birth. Learning does not involve any increase in their 
number; it involves only the making of new connections be- 
tween them. When you forget something, the “bridges” 
between certain neurones have been broken down and the 
small gaps again intervene. 
A certain biologist conducted experiments on dogs to  
test their powers of association. W e  all know that dogs 
can learn and therefore have the power of association, but 
the biologist referred to was interested in precise informa- 
tion on the subject. H e  found that a dog could be made to  
associate almost anything with food, fo r  example, the 
sound of a bell, o r  the scratching of a certain area of his 
skin. All that was necessary was to sound the bell (if this 
was involved in the connection sought) on repeated occasions 
when the food was presented to him. If now the bell was 
sounded, the dog’s mouth watered even if no food were 
presented, showing that the dog had formed the association. 
In  a similar way, the dog’s mouth might be made to water 
by simply scratching a certain area of his skin. Moreover, 
the dog could make fine distinctions. If he had been taught 
t o  respond to  a note of a hundred vibrations per second (as 
shown by his mouth watering) , one of ninety-six per second 
called forth no response; or,  if the scratching of a particu- 
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lar  skin area had been made the signal for food, a slightly 
removed adjacent area could not be substituted. A curious 
fact came out in connection with these experiments. If 
there were removed from a dog’s brain a certain area 
through which an association was known to take place, the 
signal fo r  the presentation of food, say sounding of the 
bell, did not call forth in such a dog the usual response, 
namely, watering of the mouth, but instead the dog became 
drowsy and gradually went to sleep. T h e  result is ex- 
plained by a certain process which occurs in the normal 
animal, as well as the one operated on. When the dog 
hears the sound of the bell, he concentrates his mind on the 
idea of food. This concentration implies a suppression 
of all other mental activities; to use the technical term, 
there is an “inhibition” of activity in all parts of the brain 
except the area concerned with the association. If this 
area is removed, inhibition occurs just as before, when the 
bell is sounded, and since the area is now missing to which 
all mental activity would be restricted, the dog simply 
becomes drowsy and goes to sleep. 
Our  simplest thoughts and mental states involve the 
organized activity of a t  least thousands of neurones, possi- 
bly of millions. I n  dreams, the connections between the 
neurones are haphazard and disorganized. T h e  proce.ss 
of inhibition is not in full swing, and the activity of the 
brain is not limited to a well coordinated set of neurones. 
There result the freakish connections characteristic of 
dreams. In hypnosis, there are lacking the usual inhibitions 
to suggestion, for  which reason a suggested idea, thought, 
or  action automatically goes into effect. Hypnosis is essen- 
tially an exaggerated state of susceptibility to suggestion. 
W e  are all normally more o r  less hypnotized, depending 
upon the extent to which we are susceptible to suggestion. 
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T o  the layman in psychology some of the things that have 
been written about the subconscious seem to  exaggerate the 
aspect of mystery ascribed to  it. W e  do some things sub- 
consciously, but there is no more mystery about this than 
that we should be unaware of some habitual act, such as 
walking. Any act, if sufficiently often repeated, tends to  
become habitual, and drops out of the field of attention, 
although a t  first i t  may have involved a great mental 
strain; witness a child’s attempts a t  walking o r  writing. 
Certain simple mental processes, if sufficiently often re- 
peated, may also become habitual and drop out of the field 
of attention, and then you would regard them as “sub- 
conscious.” I can readily conceive, f o r  example, that  a 
bank clerk might be adding up figures without thinking 
especially of what he is doing; in fact, his thoughts might 
be on something else, and in this case he would be adding 
subconsciously. It was inevitable, however, that  much of 
the speculation springing up in connection with psycho- 
analysis and the subconscious should run wild, but psychol- 
ogists, with occasional help on the part  of biologists, may 
be confidently expected to  set this new house in order. 
Many of the apparently intelligent acts of animals are 
achieved in an accidental manner. This  fact is indicated 
by certain experiments. Dogs were confronted with the 
problem of getting to some food from a cage, from which 
they could escape only after pressing a lever and opening 
the door to the cage. An inexperienced dog never went 
directly to the lever and pressed it. W h a t  he usually did 
was to  nose and claw impatiently about the cage until by 
accident he struck the lever and was released. When con- 
fronted with the problem the second time, he did not ap- 
proach the lever and make his escape directly, but he 
scrambled about again, this time, however, more o r  less in 
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the part of the cage where he had met with success on the 
first occasion, and as a result the number of fruitless 
efforts was reduced. On the third occasion there was a still 
further reduction in the number of errors, and so on, until 
eventually just the right move was made. This  sort of be- 
havior is generally referred to as “trial and error.” Many 
attempts are made, one succeeds by accident. The  dog 
who sees his master open a gate does not reason, “Master  
has opened the gate by pressing the latch, therefore I should 
be able to  open it in the same way.” He does not even 
imitate his master in a blind way. H e  learns to  open it 
very much in the same way a s  the dog did in learning to  
escape from the cage-by the method of trial and error. 
When students of animal behavior first learned these 
facts, there was a tendency for some of them to take the 
stand that lower animals were entirely without powers of 
reasoning, that it was man alone who had this faculty, and 
that there was a big gap, therefore, between man and any 
lower animal in this regard. In taking this attitude, they 
were probably going to extremes. They forgot that many 
of the reasoned acts of man himself were based on the 
method of trial and error. You are given a puzzle to put 
together. You do not simply size up the situation and 
arrive directly a t  the solution. Wha t  you normally do is 
to  manipulate the puzzle; you make a good many tries, 
most of them failures, but you are guided by them, just 
as the dog was, and finally you get the thing. Even the 
higher forms of reasoning, which apparently are pure ab- 
straction, involve this method of trial and error. When 
you are confronted with a problem in mathematics, sup- 
posing now you are good a t  this sort of thing, you do not 
as a rule simply set your mental machinery into operation 
and arrive directly a t  the solution. You first make what 
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amounts to a number of guesses, you try this and that pos- 
sibility, and you finally hit upon one that leads to  a result. 
The  difference between a person who is good at  mathe- 
matics, and the rest of us, is that the mathematician makes 
fewer irrelevant guesses than we, and he eliminates them 
more rapidly. When the dog learns to open the gate, this 
is the very process he goes through, but the whole thing is 
cruder and on a simpler basis. T o  be sure, the animal 
almost certainly does not go through a reasoning process 
that is consciously guided, such as when we reason that if 
A is greater than B, and B is greater than C, A is greater 
than C. But even men seldom use consciously this syllogistic 
form of reasoning. Once a problem has been got to the 
point that it can be put in the form of a syllogism, it is 
regarded as solved; the real difficulty consists in finding the 
proper clues to its solution, and this involves the making 
of guesses, as a rule. Reasoning by no means resolves 
itself entirely into a process of trial and error, but this 
process is an important element in the situation, and it has 
its crude beginnings in the animal mind. 
One of the outstanding features of human behavior is 
the use that man makes of means to  attain an end. This is 
especially evident in his use of tools, A machine is merely 
the outcome of a highly developed tool; the firearm, the 
printing press, locomotive engine, aeroplane, telephone, 
radio, all these and many others are really machines in the 
broader sense of the term. I t  is obvious that man owes 
his superiority over all other animals in large measure to  his 
use of machinery. 
T o  what extent do we find lower animals resorting to 
the use of tools, and adapting means to  end? W e  natu- 
rally look to the monkeys and apes for manifestations of 
reasoning power, because these animals approach man more 
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closely than do all others in regard to brain size and struc- 
ture. Monkeys have, in fact, been observed to  use sticks 
and other objects as tools. F o r  example, if food is placed 
beyond the reach of a chained monkey, he will use a stick 
with which to rake it in. This, t o  be sure, is a very simple 
act, but you would hardly expect a dog o r  cat to make use 
of a tool in even this simple fashion, even allowing for 
physical limitations. T h e  apes are among the few animals 
that agree with man in their capacity to  use tools. Now, 
when we look fo r  the cause of this, we naturally emphasize 
the matter of brain size; but there is another factor of im- 
portance which enters in. I refer to the development of the 
hand. It seldom occurs to  us how much of our mental 
development we owe to the hand and its manipulative 
powers. There is a constant interaction taking place be- 
tween the hand and the brain. T h e  mere handling of an 
object imparts information as regards its nature and, more- 
over, the information so gained tends to  increase manipula- 
tory skill and leads to the use of the object as a tool. T h e  
whole theory of manual training is based on this fact; i t  
involves a conscious attempt to  approach the brain through 
the hand. In  the process of evolution, a highly developed 
brain without nimble fingers to carry out its commands 
would have been useless; and on the other hand highly 
developed fingers without the brain to  direct them would 
have been equally useless, There probably was, therefore, 
a constant interaction between the two in the course of 
racial development; progress in one was made possible 
by progress in the other. Other important factors, to be 
sure, were involved in man’s mental evolution, especially 
his use of language and his social organization; but the 
development of the hand as a prehensile organ ought 
certainly t o  be included in the list, f o r  it is in this connection 
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that  man became a tool-using creature, a creature who 
learned to  attain his ends not just by tooth and nail, but by 
indirect means that were often much more effective. 
In its general outline and operation, the nervous system 
is simple enough. You touch a hot stove, and automatically 
you withdraw your hand. One nerve conveyed the message 
from skin to spinal cord, another carried the message to  
the muscles which moved your arm. T h e  spinal cord 
brought about the connection between incoming and out- 
going message. I say that the connections were made 
through the spinal cord rather than through the higher 
brain centres because the feeling of pain is not necessary 
for  this reaction. You would give very much the same re- 
action if your hand were burnt while you were asleep, and 
before you actually woke up and realized you were burnt. 
You have probably noticed that a person will withdraw his 
leg if the sole of his foot is tickled while he is in deep 
sleep and totally insensitive. This sort of response is of 
the simplest kind possible through the nervous system; it 
involves no act of will o r  reasoning. Other reactions of 
the same automatic nature are given when our eyes are  
touched and we wink, o r  when something in the throat 
causes coughing. These are all known as reflex acts. T h e  
connections which they involve through the spinal cord or 
lower brain centres are established a t  birth. T h e  more 
complicated forms of behavior take place through the higher 
brain centres and depend upon connections which are made 
af ter  birth, in the process of learning. They involve the 
hitching up of neurones originally not connected, and when 
behavior takes place through these complicated and new 
channels we refer to i t  as action based on reason o r  thought. 
In a reasoned act there are involved typically the same 
elements of nervous conduction as in the reflex act, a central 
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part  connecting incoming and outgoing messages; but in a 
reasoned act the central part  of the process is long drawn 
out. Behavior, in other words, is a more general process 
that includes thought as one of its elements. 
Reasoning, according to the view just presented, is closely 
connected with action. In fact, practically all of our mental 
processes are. The  mind evolved in connection with action, 
for  it was only in action that the mind could prove its use= 
fulness. An individual who could foresee danger and avoid 
it obviously had an advantage over one who lacked this 
capacity; and in many other ways action became more effec- 
tive under mental guidance. During the evolution of the 
race, and in the free state of competition under which 
it took place, those who lacked intelligence succumbed to 
those who had wits, and those who had wits succumbed to 
those who had more wits. In this way the mind graduaIly 
progressed under the influence of natural selection, from 
crude beginnings to  its present high state of development. 
But all the while, the mind was primarily the tool to  action. 
I t  was only in connection with action that the mind could 
justify its existence and come under the guiding influence of 
natural selection. 
The  origins of human behavior are discernible in the 
behavior of the lower animals. T h e  difference between the 
two is in most respects a matter of degree, not of kind. But 
in one respect there does seem to be a genuine difference 
between them. Among the lower animals we do not find 
the more elevated forms of behavior that we designate 
as moral. Man seems to be exceptional in this regard. It 
was for this reason that moral philosophers of the eight- 
eenth century postulated a certain faculty which was to be 
found only in man, and which they designated as the moral 
faculty or  conscience. They claimed it was unanalyzable; 
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it was an unresolvable entity-a faculty, and that was all 
there was to the matter. Developments in the field of 
psychology have, however, shed new light on this problem. 
Present-day students of psychology and animal behavior 
make no attempt to  deny the existence of a conscience and of 
the more elevated forms of behavior. Conscience and 
moral behavior are  as real to-day as ever, but what these 
students have attempted to  do is to analyze moral behavior, 
and to  find out the simpler elements of which it is made. 
I n  so doing they have pointed out two things: first, the 
instinctive nature of all voluntary acts; and second, man’s 
social nature. 
An instinct has often been defined as a spring to  action; 
the force from behind that is the basis of our desires and 
directs our acts into certain channels-witness the difference 
in the behavior of your husband before his hunger has been 
satisfied and after. If there are obstacles in the way of 
satisfying an instinct, a long train of reactions may be set 
up, A hungry person, without food o r  money with which 
to buy it, thinks of ways and means to satisfy his desire; 
he may try to earn the necessary money, o r  he may hit upon 
the happy expedient of dropping in a t  a friend’s house for  
dinner. I n  any case, the long train of reactions through 
which he goes was determined by his desire for food. I n  
this sense, the instinct is the urge-the spring to  action. 
T h e  term “instinct” usually calls to mind the instincts 
of hunger and sex; but we must not overlook the existence 
of  other important instincts, among them fear, or  the urge 
to  escape destruction; and anger, the urge to overcome per- 
sons and things that are obstacles t o  the free expression of 
other instincts. These, t o  be sure, are all instincts that  
suggest our animal nature, but without them neither the 
individual nor the race could continue its existence. It was 
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precisely these matters that were of prime importance dur- 
ing our evolution, and it was about them that behavior 
shaped itself. 
One of the instincts that always arouses our admiration, 
whether we see it expressed in man o r  in lower animals, 
is the love of the mother f o r  her young, the urge to protect, 
caress, and nourish them. This maternal instinct is more 
strongly developed in the female but by no means lacking in 
the male. I t  is this instinct that urges us to  protect the weak 
in general, and it is because of its stronger development in 
the female that women are more active than men in all 
forms of philanthropic and charitable undertakings. I n  
the male it is aroused, especially during the period of 
courtship, by the female, and it converts the mere sex at- 
traction into the more elevated and enduring form of love. 
It is this instinct, also, which is outraged by mistreatment 
of the weak, especially of children, and is a t  the root of our 
feeling of righteous indignation. T h e  maternal instinct 
certainly must be taken into account in considering many 
forms of moral behavior. 
Now the maternal instinct by itself would not suffice to  
account for  the whole of moral action. Other facts have 
to  be taken into consideration, and there is one fact in 
particular that is of especial importance; I refer to man’s 
social nature. I n  regard to his social nature man occupies 
a unique position in the animal kingdom. I n  most other 
species an individual can, after a Ionger or shorter period 
of infancy and dependency, shift for  itself and lead an 
almost isolated existence. But fo r  man this would be an 
almost unthinkable state. H e  would be changed from the 
most powerful of all creatures to  one of the weakest, from 
a thinking being with the power of language, to one whose 
mental furniture consisted almost entirely of his immediate 
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bodily wants. His acts would be neither moral nor im- 
moral; they would be non-moral. It is only in coming 
into contact with others that  a child soon learns that some 
of his acts meet with approval and others with disapproval. 
Accordingly, he comes to  set up certain standards of right 
and wrong, and his behavior becomes modified accordingly. 
T o  be sure, he has not yet achieved the highest plane of 
social conduct, but he is on the way. Moreover, it is only 
in coming into contact with others that  the child distin- 
guishes between himself and others. If he were entirely 
isolated, there would be no occasion for  such a distinction; 
he would not think of himself as an individual distinct from 
others. T h e  concept of self, therefore, depends, in its 
development, upon social contact. Without this concept, 
the sense of responsibility and moral behavior would be 
impossible. 
Now, there is dependent upon the concept of self the 
expression of two instincts, one characterized by an emotion 
known as positive self-feeling, the other by the emotion, 
negative self-feeling. These instincts may be aroused in 
a large variety of ways. Very commonly praise, if i t  is 
properly dished out, arouses in us our positive self-feeling; 
but praise is by no means the only stimulus fo r  this instinct. 
When, fo r  example, a proud father tells you how clever 
his children are, he is really boosting himself, for  he identi- 
fies his children with himself, and they arouse his positive 
self-feeling. A work of a r t  arouses in the artist his posi- 
tive self-feeling; the act of creating in general does, entirely 
apart  from the praise of others. T h e  instinct characterized 
by negative self-feeling is just the opposite in its effect t o  
the one characterized by positive self-feeling. These two 
instincts are very important in their bearing on moral be- 
havior. As the individual gains in maturity, his instincts in 
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general become harmoniously organized about certain ideals 
of behavior, ideals which become so firmly ingrained in him 
that he comes to  identify them with himself; and as a result, 
any course of conduct which conforms to the ideal arouses 
in him his positive self-feeling, and any course which defeats 
it arouses his negative self-feeling. The  foundations are 
now laid for the more elevated forms of conduct. 
This analysis makes no attempt a t  completeness, but I 
hope it wilI a t  least suggest that no adequate account of 
moral behavior can ignore man’s instinctive make-up and 
his social nature. 
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